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Ning Lao T’ai T’ai lived with her husband and two daughters in the town of
P’englai in the Shandong province of Northern China. For years they starved.
Throughout 1937 and 1938, shortly before the commencement of the Second SinoJapanese War, Ida Pruitt captured the tragic life story of Lao T’ai T’ai in her
biography A Daughter of Han: The Autobiography of a Chinese Working Woman
[1945]. For most of their lives, Ning Lao and her family lacked access to basic
sustenance. One day, Ning Lao was so desperate that she pounded a brick into
dust, and consumed it. One would be forgiven for assuming that P’englai was a
city under siege, or that perhaps it had been struck by a natural catastrophe—this
was not the case. The primary reason Ning and her family were starving was
because their father, a fisherman, used his daily wages to purchase opium. He was
addicted to this substance. From time to time, his daily wages were insufficient for
his addiction, and he would sell furniture, shirts, and his own children in order to
suffice. The first time, he sold his four year old daughter to human traffickers.
Ning Lao herself was made aware of his transaction only after he has stumbled
through the front door, still intoxicated from his opium, with a sack of sweet
potatoes. Ning Lao was able to recover her daughter, only to have her sold once
more by her husband to a local elite family. It would be insufficient to state that the
opium trade crippled the family of Ning Lao T’ai T’ai. Hundreds of thousands of
Chinese were regular consumers of opium by the end of the 19th Century.

2

This inquiry seeks to establish that American merchants exacerbated China’s
19th century opium epidemic. The British Empire, the largest global exporter of
opium, fought two bloody wars against Qing China to ensure its right to sell opium
to Chinese dealers. Consequently, the British are often attributed as being the
primary benefactors, and the primary cause, of the Opium Wars. Further
investigation reveals, however, that the United States played a larger, more sinister
role in the opium trade than perhaps enough people recognize.

The British Monopoly
For the better part of the 18th century, opium was present in China—although with
subtlety. Batches of opium, generally few and far between, had been considered by
the Chinese as a fine luxury that also possessed an occasional medicinal purpose.
In his history Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China’s Last
Golden Age, historian Stephen R. Platt (2018, 195) recognizes opium as having
limited social stigma—despite its official denunciation by the Emperor in this
period. Some of the earliest records of British importation of opium into China
occurs in the early 18th century. In 1733, Chinese imperial edicts outlawing the
importation and consumption of opium led captains of the East India Company—
Britain’s crown-sanctioned trading monopoly of the East—to grow wary of
employing their ships to carry opium to Chinese ports. British authorities believed
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that the minimal profits associated with the opium trade were outweighed by the
risk of losing out on the very profitable trade that had been made in silks, teas, and
porcelain. In response to these imperial edicts, and seeing a profitable future for
their trade, opium producers of the East India Company began a new approach.
Their plan entailed the growing and manufacturing of smokable opium and the
subsequent selling of their product to private merchants at the port of Calcutta, on
the eastern coast of the Indian subcontinent. These private merchants would
assume the risk themselves by making the trip to Canton to sell their toxic
merchandise for large profits. In this way, the East India Company was able to
both deny its involvement in the illegal importation of opium into China, while
simultaneously reaping the profits of doing so. Indeed, this method was so covert
that representatives of the company in Cantonese warehouses were left unaware of
its employer’s engagement in the illicit trade.
Initially, the East India Company maintained an essential monopoly on
global opium production. Platt (2018, 195) argues that this initial situation was not
only profitable for the East India Company, but relatively beneficial to China as a
whole once compared to the situation that would later develop in subsequent
decades. Although the monopolistically high price of opium had perhaps been
unpopular among opium smokers, its limited quantity kept the product a luxury
beyond the grasp of the average Chinese. However, as the name suggests, the East
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India Company maintained a monopoly in only one geographic region of India.
Starting in the 1820’s, Malwa opium, as it would be called, was grown by
independent farmers in the central and western portions of India. Mirroring the
East India Company, farmers and traders would sell their comparatively cheap
Malwa opium at Bombay on the Western coast of India—beyond the control of the
Company—to private Parsi and British merchants. In an effort to price-out private
opium producers in Western India, the East India Company ramped up its
production in the hopes of driving the price of opium so low that private
manufacturers could simply not compete.
British ships had attempted to blockade Malwa opium to little success.
Instead, the East India Company decided to merely buy the entire supply of Malwa
opium in order to maintain its monopoly. However, the Company’s practices
merely increased the demand for Malwa opium, and as a result the growers of
Malwa ramped up production. As opium became more cheap and more abundant,
Chinese demand rose. As well, Malwa opium was not the only competition the
East India Company needed to be wary of. Fierce competition in Cantonese ports
would be offered by the Americans
The Americans had a different perception of what constituted proper
international trade. Whereas the British preferred a centrally focused and wellordered monopoly to maximize profits, Americans favored a more competitive,
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cut-throat, laissez-faire system. In his history America’s First Adventure in China:
Trade, Treaties, Opium, and Salvation, John R. Haddad (2013, 32) argues that the
American approach to the China trade incentivized opportunistic and
entrepreneurial individuals to Chinese ports. These Americans, however, had no
intention of preserving the free, laissez faire model that their nation officially
represented. The firms that would emerge in this period would be unregulated and
untethered by moral quandary. These Americans sought to dominate the trade.

Thomas Perkins, John Cushing, and Robert Forbes
One 19th century American firm would rise above the rest: Perkins & Company.
Its founder, Thomas Handasyd Perkins, made but one trip to China during his
entire lifetime. The 1788 Canton voyage, planned by New England trader Elias
Hasket Derby, was nearly a complete commercial blunder. All four ships carried
similar cargo and sought to bring back home the same iconic Chinese goods. Of
course, upon their arrival, the merchants realized the sudden manner in which they
had brought the same goods to the same market had tanked their value. As well,
their sudden demand had greatly increased value of the commodities for which
they were searching. Although it was just one trip, Haddad (2013, 34-36) claims
that Perkins would learn extensively about the do’s and dont’s of the China trade.
Perkins’ leadership in rerouting all four ships to arrive at different ports at more
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opportunistic times allowed the merchant fleet to sell its cargo profitably without
flooding the market with their own goods. Specifically, Perkins had learned to
disseminate risk with joint-stock ventures, to plan logistical aspects of the trade in
a rational sense, to use large merchant ships and warehouses to dull out cargo only
when market prices were deemed sufficient, and to monopolize the supply of a
resource whenever possible. Finally, Perkins devised the use of meritocratic
nepotism; the potential utility of carefully selected young relatives who would
serve him loyally.
In one such instance of meritocratic nepotism, Thomas Perkins would hire
his then 16 year old nephew John Perkins Cushing to help make an opium dynasty
of Perkins & Co. In 1803, at the age of 26, Cushing became the assistant taipan, or
assistant company head, of the American office in Canton. However, Perkins &
Co. would suffer many setbacks in the first decade of the 19th century that would
jettison Cushing into the primary leadership role. The supply of Perkins & Co’s
primary trading commodity—furs trapped in the Pacific Northwest—had come to
dwindle. Native American populations grew hostile as a result of the exploitation
of one of their few natural commodities; during one negotiation between the
company and a native tribe, four native men would put an axe into the head of one
of Perkins’ captains. Simultaneously, Britain’s cease of its slave trade complicated
the success of Perkins & Co., which itself dabbled in the commodification of slave
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labor. Finally, Ephriam Bumstead, the man Perkins’ had tasked as taipan, grew ill
and evacuated Canton. The abilities of the young Cushing would be put to the test.
Cushing excelled in his role. Haddad (2013, 48-52) observes Cushing’s
conception and facilitation of a ruthless importation of vast quantities of Turkish
opium into Southern China. Perkins first crossed paths with the opium trade during
the war of 1812, when his ship—the Jacob Jones—raided and captured an opiumcarrying British ship. Upon his request, the cargo was shipped off to Canton, where
Perkins & Co. made a fantastic profit upon its sale. In 1815, Perkins sent another
ship, the Monkey, to the Medditerranean. Upon its delivery of sugar, it filled its
hold with Turkish opium. After yet another profitable sale of opium at Canton,
Perkins recruited a new young family member to reside in Ottoman city of Izmir to
observe the region’s opium production. Upon the arrival of yet more opium back in
Canton, Cushing developed a sinister method that would come to be known as the
Lintin System. Whereas previous Western merchants smuggled opium through the
only open Chinese port at Canton, Cushing sought to develop a more subtle plan.
Firstly, ships carrying opium would send a message via a fast boat to Cushing of
their impending arrival. Next, ships of the Perking & Co. fleet would no longer
enter Canton nor would they would take pilot; Cushing’s ships would not follow
Chinese junks which attempted to escort them. Instead, these ships would anchor
themselves off the small island of Lintin at the estuary of the Pearl River. There,
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Chinese smugglers would meet them, purchase their opium, and sail back to
Chinese shores. Compared to foreign merchants, Chinese merchants faced few
regulations. Not that this mattered much to Cushing, as Perkins & Co. was now
reaping the profit of opium smuggling without any of the associated risk. Shorty
after its implementation, this system proved so successful that ships were planted
at Lintin indefinitely to serve as floating warehouses. With such success, Perkins
decided to double down on the opium trade.
In a gamble, Perkins moved to monopolize the Turkish opium supply. He
sent word to his office in Izmir to purchase all available opium. Haddad (2013, 51)
writes that such a great quantity of opium flowed as a result of Perkins’ takeover
that Cushing, back in Canton, had a difficult time processing it through Lintin.
Cushing, however, now had such a quantity of opium that he, like the East India
Company before him, was able to—in effect—completely regulate the price of
Turkish opium. In fact, Cushing held so much power in Canton that he would be a
concern to the British Parliament. Capitalizing upon the success of his smuggling
system, Cushing now devised a plan whereby he could expand or contract the
available supply of Turkish opium in Canton by deciding when—and how much—
opium to sell from his floating warehouses. Using this system, Cushing crushed
opium speculators. Upon hearing word of would-be competitors, Cushing would
flood the market with his opium, tanking its value. Any who arrived in Canton
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wishing to compete with him would have to sell at his price. In most instances this
price would bankrupt small opium merchants.
To the belief of Haddad (2013, 111-113), while initiating his company’s
opium trade in Canton, Perkins was seeking to expand the human capital of
Perkins & Co. by grooming more young relatives. In 1817, Robert Bennet
Forbes—then thirteen—was inspired by his uncle Perkins to become a cabin boy
aboard one of his ships, the Canton Packet. Upon reaching Canton, Cushing was
impressed by the spirit of his young cousin, and came to view him as an eventual
successor. Due in large part to his family ties, Robert Forbes became captain of his
uncle’s favorite ship, the Levant, by age twenty. Slowly, Cushing and Perkins
would increasingly involve Forbes in their opium trade, much to his delight.
Forbes began by bringing ships to Lintin island and escorting Chinese smugglers
along the Chinese coast. Later, in 1828, Forbes led missions between Izmir and
Canton for the purpose of moving large amounts of opium. The trade itself
eventually became Forbes’ identity. In 1830, he expressed his desire to
“accomplish the destiny to which God and my uncles had con-signed me.” With
the approval of his uncle, Forbes oversaw the construction of his own new ship, the
Lintin. With this ship, Haddad (2013, 112-115) argues, Forbes oversaw the sale of
more opium than any other American in history. He became fabulously rich. Platt
(2018, 193-194) explains the simplicity and profitability of—perhaps as Forbes
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would have seen it—the work of God. Using the system that had been devised by
Cushing, the Lintin remained motionless as a floating warehouse for smugglers. He
bore neither the risk of moving the opium to the South China sea, nor the risk of
smuggling the opium into the Chinese interior. For his efforts, Forbes made
$800,000 per year, in modern dollars.
Although of critical importance to the story, Perkins, Cushing, and Forbes
were by no means the only Americans responsible for the exacerbation of China’s
opium crisis. In their 1937 work, Gold of Ophir: The China Trade in the Making of
America, Sydney Greenbie & Marjorie Barstow Greenbie (1972, 174) reveal that
besides one or two American firms, all foreign firms present in Canton were
engaged in the smuggling of opium in some fashion. Additionally, Greenbie &
Greenbie (1972, 238-239) consider many American merchants to have carried
reckless disregard, and even open-aired mallace, for the wishes of Chinese
authorities. One such American firm, N. & G. Griswald, wrote that Americans
“have always been more or less engaged in the [opium] trade, and probably always
will be. We believe that ultimately the Emperor [of China] will find it necessary to
legalize the traffic [of opium] under the imposition of heavy duties.” Upon the
commencement of the First Opium War, former American President John Quincy
Adams was furious with the Chinese. In an 1841 article, he claimed the Qing
Dynasty’s ceasure of British opium was “an outrage” that challenged “the rights of
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nations” to sell opium to the Chinese. The cause of the war, to Adams, was not the
opium but the Kowtow—the request of the Chinese Emperor for foreign
delegations to bow nine times before the commencement of official business.
Adams wrote in anger that “[China] will hold commercial intercourse with the rest
of mankind, not upon terms of equal reciprocity, but upon the insulting and
degrading forms of relations between lord and vassal.” Although most Americans
publicly disagreed with Adams, the British hostility towards the Chinese, and the
opium trade in general, American merchants helped provoke and profited heavily
from the two Opium Wars.
Although the United States had not participated in either the First nor
Second Opium War, it was partially responsible for the spawn of conflict. Platt
(2018, 440) concludes that America’s engagement in the opium trade at Catnon
precipitously reduced the market share of the East India Company. Evidently, this
fall in market share then encouraged the East India Company to increase its opium
exports to China, thus setting the stage for the First Opium War. During the war
itself, American merchants observed increased profitability while simultaneously
gaining favor with the Chinese authorities. During the conflict British trade had
been effectively halted, giving American opium smugglers complete control of the
market. Furthermore, by refusing to participate in the war, the United States had
kept its ships and sailors out of harm’s way and appeared less hostile to the
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Chinese than their British counterparts. And when the war was won by the British,
Americans gained access to the same new Chinese ports that many British sailors
had died to open.

Legacy, Justification, and Revisionism
Primarily, westerners had traveled to East Asian shores in search of unique goods
that consumers back home had desperately demanded. Porcelain, silk, and tea
could be sold for a high price. Generally speaking, the Chinese economy was self
sufficient. Trade goods that Americans or Europeans had to offer were either
already possessed by the Chinese, or were otherwise frivolous. Furthermore, the
Chinese were skeptical of foreign influence, particularly as it related to religion.
For these reasons, the Qing dynasty had kept trade and travel with the west strictly
limited to Canton. Emperor Qianlong had allowed trade with the West as a favor.
Additionally, merchants could only live in designated zones on the periphery of the
city. No women or family were allowed. This system of strict and limited trade
came to be known as the Canton System. Haddad (2013, 116) propounds that the
Canton System made trading displeasurable for westnern merchants. The long
distance from their loved ones, in addition to the strict regulation of their living and
trading conditions, lead merchants to seek a fast profit that would allow them to
quickly return home. Opium would prove to be the means for just such a profit.
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Opium would be so profitable that it is little wonder why so many engaged
in the trade. According to Platt (2018, 197-199), between 1820 and 1830, total
opium imports almost quadrupled. Between 1830 and 1831, nearly 19,000 chests
of opium would find their way to China. Roughly 8% of this trade was Turkish
opium, trafficked almost exclusively by Americans. All of this is to say that
Americans, during the 1830-31 season, imported nearly 1,500 chests of opium into
China, roughly valued at 28 billion dollars in today’s money. Greenbie &
Greenbie (1972, 238) acknowledge that 1827, America had made up its trade
balance with China: more silver was leaving China than was being brought in. The
United States was importing silver, silk, tea, and porcelain, while China was
importing opium. A decidedly unequal trade. By 1834, the facade had dissolved,
and opium became the primary method of exchange for Chinese commodities. This
trade not only weakened the Chinese economy, but the Chinese populace as well.
Haddad (2013, 114-115), in combing through the personal correspondence
of American opium traders, determines that American merchants engaged in the
trade were aware and indifferent of its consequences for the Chinese people. In an
1839 letter to his wife, Robert Forbes—the foremost runner of American opium—
admitted that his trade had been “demoralizing the minds, destroying the bodies, &
draining [China] of money.” Warren Delano, another merchant of opium, claimed
that opium smuggling was a “fair, honorable, and legitimate trade,” similar in its
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limited consequence to “the importation of wines, brandies & spirits.” John
Perkins Cushing had a rather cold outlook on his trade. Haddad (2013, 52) argues
that Cushing emphasized the importance of developing the opium trade in a
systematic manner, in order to overshadow its moral implications.
Later in life however, Haddad (2013, 114-115) concludes, American opium
merchants were hesitant to discuss their participation in the matter. In the 1870’s
Robert Forbes attempted to document the history and evolution of his company,
Russell & Co. When attempting to correspond with old associates in order to
compile just such a history, he received few and largely unenthusiastic responses.
Warren Delano offered a vague outline of events, and completely avoided the
mention of opium altogether. One reason for such a lackluster response can be
traced to the desire of American merchants to forget their dishonorable trade.
Many of these merchants simply desired to make their fortunes and return to the
United States. As The patriarch of the esteemed Delano family, Warren’s lineage
would eventually produce such influential figures as American President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt. John Forbes, younger brother of Robert, would go on from the
trade to create a successful family dynasty himself, perhaps best exemplified by his
descendant State John Forbes Kerry—former Secretary of State and presidential
hopeful. To the belief of Hadad (2013, 115), figures such as Delano and Forbes
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had no desire to associate the success and wealth of their families with the
distasteful opium trade.
According to Haddad (2013, 168), the United States government did little to
discourage the opium trade. The American public, in general, viewed the opium
trade negatively and official U.S. policy considered the smuggling of opium as
illegal. However, nearly no resources were dedicated to the U.S. Commissioner in
Canton, William Reed, to prevent the trade. Reed himself detested opium. To make
matters worse, during the Second Opium War, American trade was expanding: In
Shanghai, where a total of 32,000 chests of opium had been smuggled in the year
1857, one fifth of the trade had been brought by Americans. In 1858, Reed had
decided to work with the Chinese and British to update the Chinese tariff system to
include a tax on opium, in effect legalizing the importation of the drug. Although
opposed to opium, Reed believed its legalization to be preferable to the facade then
in place. He wrote with sorrow, “so the opium war of 1840 has at length ended in
an opium triumph... the honorable English merchants and government can now
exonerate themselves.” Despite his own wishes, Reed was powerless to stop the
trade. Although he chalked up his failure to abide by his morality to the British, his
role—and indeed that of numerous American traders—in the proliferation and
legalization of opium in China is self-evident.
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British poet Thomas De Quincey suffered from an unshakable allure to
opium. In his 1821 work, Confessions of an English Opium-Eater, De Quincey
detailed his addiction. Much like Ning Lao T’ai T’ai, he starved and lived in
inhumane conditions for a considerable portion of his life. In concluding his work,
De Quincey (2003, 86) wrote “Not the opium-eater, but the opium, is the true hero
of the tale...the object[ive] was to display the marvellous agency of opium, whether
for pleasure or for pain… opium had long ceased to found its empire on spells of
pleasure; it was solely by the tortures connected with the attempt to abjure it, that it
kept its hold.” Indeed, in China, opium had taken a firm grasp.

Conclusion
This inquiry has sought to establish that American merchants exacerbated China’s
19th century opium epidemic. Numerous American merchants participated in the
smuggling and selling of opium to Chinese merchants with reckless disregard.
Although great profits were made, the imported opium had severe consequences
for the Chinese people for generations. The opium trade, the Opium Wars, and the
subsequent “unequal treaties” served as merely the first steps in a series of tragic
historical events, including the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and two civil wars
which concluded with a climactic end by means of the pronouncement of the
People’s Republic of China by Mao Zedong in 1949. This historical arch is
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foundational knowledge to modern Chinese history and is learned—in a
compulsory sense—by every Chinese as the “Century of Humiliation,” and as such
has considerable implications upon the psyche of modern China.
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